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Foreword
The series of international ﬁnancial crises that began
in the mid-1990s—the Mexican peso crisis of 1994–95,
the Asian ﬁnancial crisis of 1997, the Russian default
of 1998, the Brazilian crisis of 1998–99, and more
recently, the situations in Turkey and Argentina—
have been very costly to those directly affected and to
the global economy more generally. Considerable
work has been undertaken within the public, aca-
demic, and private sectors to ﬁnd ways to prevent and
better manage such crises. Signiﬁcant progress has
been made, but there is a general recognition that the
work is not complete. The issues are complex. While
each crisis has had a unique character, there have
been a number of common elements from which les-
sons are being learned.
In terms of crisis prevention, there is broad consensus
on the steps countries should take, and the interna-
tional community has devoted considerable resources
to assist in the task. There has been less agreement,
however, on how crises should be resolved once they
do occur.
It is in this latter area—the resolution of international
ﬁnancial crises—that the Bank of Canada and the
Bank of England have undertaken joint work. The
paper “The Resolution of International Financial
Crises: Private Finance and Public Funds,” by
Andy Haldane and Mark Kruger, pulls together the
work we have done over the past year and a half.
Our objective in this joint effort has been to develop a
framework for crisis resolution that aligns the incen-
tives of all parties in a way that deals with the crisis
and preserves the integrity of the international ﬁnan-
cial system. It is a framework built on principles, not
rules. It is a framework that attempts to be clear about
the respective roles and responsibilities of the public
and private sectors. This is especially important in
light of the substantial changes in recent years in inter-
national ﬁnancial markets. It is also important for the
accountability of decisions taken.
The cornerstone of the framework is a strong pre-
sumption about the scale of “normal” access to ofﬁcial
ﬁnancing. Such a presumption, we believe, would
provide the backstop for debtor-creditor negotiations
and help condition expectations in ﬁnancial markets.
With limits on International Monetary Fund lending,
private sector involvement becomes a crucial part of
crisis resolution. The precise form of private sector
involvement is a choice for the debtor country. But it
would be selected from a range of options, including
both voluntary and involuntary solutions. Among the
former, bond exchanges and agreement with creditors
to reschedule debt have proved helpful in past crises.
Among the latter, standstills are potentially useful in
dealing with crisis situations and are included in the
framework as an important part of the international
community’s “tool kit” for crisis resolution.
The international community faces many challenges
in promoting the beneﬁts of global economic integra-
tion. The prevention and resolution of international
ﬁnancial crises remains one of those challenges. By
publishing this joint work, the Bank of Canada and
the Bank of England hope to further the debate and
discussion of these important matters and to move us
closer to agreement on how the international ﬁnancial
system can be improved.
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ince the mid-1990s, the incidence of ﬁnancial
crises among emerging-market countries
appears to have increased. In response, gov-
ernments and international ﬁnancial institu-
tions have worked intensively on ways to reduce the
likelihood and virulence of crises. This is the debate
on the so-called “international ﬁnancial architecture.”
There is now a fairly widespread
consensus within the ofﬁcial
community on appropriate crisis-
prevention measures.
There is now a fairly widespread consensus within the
ofﬁcial community on appropriate crisis-prevention
measures. For example, the best defence against ﬁnan-
cial crises is to establish sound macroeconomic funda-
mentals and to have a credible policy framework able
to deal with economic and ﬁnancial shocks. A broad
international consensus has also emerged on the
importance of prudent balance-sheet management,
with a particular focus on the balance-sheet positions
of governments and the ﬁnancial system. And consid-
erable work has been done by international groups to
establish codes and standards of best public policy
practice. The ofﬁcial community should not be pre-
scriptive about the adoption of standards. But it
should promote transparency about the degree of
country compliance with them.
Even with such prevention measures in place, how-
ever, crises will still occur from time to time. More-
over, there is less consensus among policy-makers on
appropriate crisis-resolution measures in these circum-
stances. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has
responded to crises by providing often large-scale lend-
ing packages, conditional on the implementation of
macroeconomic and structural reform. These programs
are intended to offer bridging ﬁnance to the debtor.
And this combination of reform plus bridging ﬁnance
is in turn intended to help catalyze private sector capital
ﬂows.
But there is a concern that ofﬁcial lending on this scale
may also undermine the incentives of debtors and
creditors operating in international capital markets—
a moral-hazard risk. And the lack of ex ante clarity
S
about the scale of ofﬁcial assistance represents an
additional source of risk for borrowers and lenders
operating in these markets. It may also serve to delay
negotiations between debtors and creditors should
repayment problems arise.
Against that backdrop, this paper sets out an alterna-
tive framework for the resolution of international
ﬁnancial crises. The framework has the following
ingredients. It is based on a presumption that multi-
lateral ofﬁcial ﬁnance is limited in size. These limits
mean that there would be some point at which the pri-
vate sector would necessarily be involved in resolving
crises. The precise form of private sector involvement
will depend on the crisis at hand. A range of private
sector involvement options are possible, including
voluntary debt rollovers and bond exchanges. From
time to time, the crisis may necessitate the debtor call-
ing a temporary payments standstill. This can be done
in an orderly fashion, with support from the IMF,s oa s
to beneﬁt creditors as well as debtors. The framework
allows for IMF lending
limits to be breached in exceptional circumstances.
But such exceptional ﬁnancing would be subject to
strict procedural safeguards.
In one sense, the proposal made here is a modest one,
because all of its elements already exist. The key dif-
ference is that here these elements are put together in
the context of a sequenced and structured crisis-reso-
lution framework. Sequenced because the resolution
of a crisis can be traced out as a chronological decision
tree; and structured because the framework aims to
align the incentives of all parties to a crisis. In this
way, the incidence and cost of crises would potentially
be reduced.
A Spectrum of Approaches to Crisis
Resolution
There has been intense debate among academics and
policy-makers on the best approach to crisis resolu-
tion. At one end of the spectrum, some have sug-
gested that the IMFcould provide emergency liquidity
assistance in potentially unlimited amounts—an inter-
national lender of last resort. At the other end, ofﬁcial
ﬁnance is seen by some as part of the problem.
Fischer (2000) argues that not only is there a need for
an international lender of last resort, but that the IMF
has de facto taken on this role. He argues that it is not
necessary for an international lender of last resort to
be able to issue liquidity in order to be effective. What
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from liquid to illiquid entities. Since the IMF is akin to
a credit union, potential borrowers have access to a
pool of resources that the IMF can onlend from mem-
ber countries. In addition, Fischer notes that the IMF
canborrowfromtheGeneralArrangementstoBorrow
(GAB) or the New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB),
where necessary.
The International Financial Institutions Advisory
Commission (2000), the “Meltzer Commission,” also
recommends that the IMF act as an international
lender of last resort. Liquidity loans would have short
maturity (120 days, with one rollover), be made at a
penalty rate, and be collateralized by a clear priority
claim on the borrower's assets. Moreover, loans would
be made only to countries that had met stringent pre-
conditions, including conditions on financial soundness.
Schwartz (1998) argues that ofﬁcial ﬁnancial institu-
tions engender moral hazard and so do more harm
than good. She notes that the private sector success-
fully dealt with ﬁnancial panics in the latter part of the
19th century by relying on clearing-house loan certiﬁ-
cates by private sector clearing houses. Thus,
Schwartz recommends that ”in the interest of a more
stable and more free international economy” the IMF be
abolished, not reformed.
These approaches are unlikely to be optimal. Turning
the IMF into an international lender of last resort is
impractical as there is neither the capacity nor the
political will to provide ofﬁcial money in unlimited
amounts with the requisite speed. It is also undesira-
ble because of the risk of moral hazard affecting both
debtors and creditors. This would hinder the efﬁcient
intermediation of funds from developed to develop-
ing countries.
Equally, a world without ofﬁcial ﬁnance would also be
suboptimal. This would ensure the maximum degree
of private sector involvement. But crisis resolution
would come about through a combination of greater
policy adjustment by the debtor and/or greater
ﬁnancing by the private sector. So output losses would
be sharp and payment interruptions frequent and dis-
orderly. Such an outcome would have adverse conse-
quences for creditors as well as debtors—a deadweight
cost. In short, it too would hinder the efﬁcient func-
tioning of the international ﬁnancial system.
Between these two extremes, there is a middle way.
This would recognize that modest amounts of ofﬁcial
money can serve as a deterrent to self-fulﬁlling crises
and provide time for policy adjustment. For example,
the Independent Task Force sponsored by the Council
on Foreign Relations, Inc. (1999) argued that the IMF
should return to normal lending limits for crises that
do not pose a systemic threat. In exceptional circum-
stances, the IMF should turn to the NAB/GAB or a
“contagion facility.” And activation of the systemic
facilities would require a supermajority decision by
creditors.
The Current Framework for Crisis
Resolution
Some progress has also been made by the ofﬁcial sec-
tor in cultivating that middle way. For example, the
statement by the G-7 at the Cologne Summit in 1999
set down some principles and tools for dealing with
crises. By themselves, however, these principles and
tools do not constitute a fully-ﬂedged framework for
crisis resolution. We know the ingredients of such a
framework but still lack a recipe for combining them.
In this respect, we would highlight two aspects of the
current framework that warrant attention.
First, there is a need for greater clarity regarding the
amount of ofﬁcial ﬁnancing. The size of ofﬁcial pack-
ages has varied considerably across recent IMF pro-
grams. And in a number of recent large-country cases,
normal IMF access limits have been breached, often by
a signiﬁcant margin. Too much discretion regarding
ofﬁcial actions leads to confusion among debtors and
creditors and time-consistency problems among pol-
icy-makers. Greater clarity about the scale of ofﬁcial
ﬁnancing would help to condition the actions and
expectations of debtors and creditors about the roles
they are expected to play in resolving crises.
Second, some of the crisis-resolution tools identiﬁed
by the ofﬁcial sector have so far been underutilized.
One example would be the inclusion of collective-
action clauses in bond contracts to facilitate debt
restructuring. Another would be a payments stand-
still, which provides a debtor with temporary respite
from debt payments and allows for an orderly work-
ing out of debt problems. Too often in the past, sover-
eign default has been disorderly, with the work-out
process slow, inefﬁcient, and inequitable. A better
approach would recognize that default is a natural
feature of the market mechanism, not something to be
avoided at all costs. But it would seek to limit the costs
of sovereign default when they do occur.6 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2001–2002
A Clear Framework
The framework presented here aims to strike a bal-
ance between ofﬁcial lending, debtor adjustment, and
private sector involvement, recognizing that each has
a role to play in the resolution of crises. But those roles
and responsibilities need to be made clear ex ante to
all parties. Indeed, this is precisely the role of a crisis-
resolution framework.
The key elements of this proposed framework are as
follows:
A presumption of limited ofﬁcial ﬁnance
When crises strike, macroeconomic policies have to be
adjusted to offset the adverse effects of shocks. But
policy adjustment usually takes time. If policy is not
credible, or if ﬁnancial markets are impatient, then
the prospect of adjustment may not be sufficient to
change expectations. A country can fall victim to a
self-fulﬁlling speculative attack.
Ofﬁcial money can help in these
circumstances, serving as bridging
ﬁnance during the period of domestic
adjustment and helping catalyze
private capital ﬂows.
Ofﬁcial money can help in these circumstances, serv-
ing as bridging ﬁnance during the period of domestic
adjustment and helping catalyze private capital ﬂows.
But such lending needs to be limited, to prevent the
adjustment incentives of debtors from being dented,
or ofﬁcial money simply substituting for private capi-
tal ﬂows. For this reason, there should be a clear pre-
sumption that “normal” ofﬁcial lending limits apply
in times of crisis.
Greater clarity about the limits on IMF lending would
deliver three important beneﬁts. First, it would reduce
uncertainty, among both creditors and debtors, about
the extent of the public sector contribution. Private
creditors demand compensation for that uncertainty
through a risk premium, which increases the cost of
borrowing for emerging markets. A clearer frame-
work for crisis resolution would reduce that uncer-
tainty premium, to the beneﬁt of both debtors and
creditors.
Second, limits would reduce the potential for the pri-
vate sector to game the ofﬁcial sector into providing
more money ex post than would have been optimal
ex ante. The ofﬁcial sector has to strike a balance
between the need to resolve the current ﬁnancial crisis
and the need to prevent future ﬁnancial crises. In
short, the official sector faces a time-consistency problem
(Kydland and Prescott 1977).
This balance between ex ante and ex post efﬁciency
is familiar from a corporate bankruptcy context
(Eichengreen and Portes 1995). The IMF faces a similar
dilemma (Miller and Zhang 1999). As Rogoff (1999)
argues, bailouts by the IMF encourage greater risk-
taking by banks in industrialized countries, and those
banks are also likely to take risks because of domestic
support arrangements.
Policy-makers are, of course, familiar with the
time-consistency problem. It crops up in all ﬁelds of
public policy—ﬁscal, monetary, regulatory, etc. In
response, they have often adopted clearer public
policy frameworks. For example, in the monetary pol-
icy sphere, inﬂation targeting combines clarity about
the objective of policy—the inﬂation target—with dis-
cretion about how best to achieve this target. It is a
framework of “constrained discretion,” with clear
roles and responsibilities for the different players. This
helps mitigate time-consistency problems in monetary
policy.
The adoption of a clear framework for crisis resolution
could offer the international ﬁnancial community sim-
ilar time-consistency beneﬁts. It would set out the pre-
sumptive constraints on official lending. And debtors
and creditors would then have the discretion to oper-
ate in their own best interests, subject to these
constraints.
Some have argued that the ofﬁcial sector should pur-
sue a policy of “constructive ambiguity” in the resolu-
tion of crises. An analogy is sometimes made with
domestic lender-of-last-resort facilities, where ambi-
guity is used to mitigate moral hazard. But interna-
tional moral hazard can be mitigated in ways that do
not introduce costly uncertainty into the framework
for crisis resolution—for example, by limiting lending.
Third, a related beneﬁt of lending limits is that they
would guard against moral hazard. Moral hazard
applies to both debtors (by blunting incentives to
undertake the necessary adjustment and reform) and
creditors (by blunting incentives to undertake effec-
tive risk management). Moral hazard is clearly a ques-
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some degree of moral hazard. And the empirical evi-
dence on the moral-hazard effects of ofﬁcial lending is
not conclusive. Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence of
the importance of moral hazard is widespread. And
the longer the current system of non-binding lending
limits persists, the greater the scope for moral hazard
to increase in the future.
The nature of private sector involvement
While there is broad agreement on the need for pri-
vate sector involvement in crisis resolution, there is
still uncertainty about what precisely it means and
how best to bring it about.
Crisis lending by the ofﬁcial sector and private sector
involvement are two sides of the same coin. So with
limited IMF lending, private sector involvement
would at some stage become an element in resolving
all crises.
The precise form of private sector involvement is,
above all, a choice for the debtor country, in consultation
with its creditors. A spectrum of private sector
involvement options is possible. Both voluntary solu-
tions (such as bond exchanges and debt rollovers) and
involuntary solutions (such as standstills) should be
acceptable, in principle, by the ofﬁcial community.
The role of the ofﬁcial sector is to make clear on what
terms and conditions ofﬁcial ﬁnance will be available,
and the limits of that ﬁnance. The debtor country must
then decide for itself which option to take. The appro-
priate option will depend on the speciﬁcs of the crisis
at hand.
In the majority of crisis cases, it should be possible for
debtors to secure private sector involvement voluntar-
ily, either by raising new money in the markets, or by
reproﬁling existing money in consultation with credi-
tors. This has worked effectively in helping resolve
crises in the past—for example, in Korea in 1997 and
in Brazil in 1999. For countries with unsustainable
debt burdens, market-based bond exchanges, which
write down the face value of debt outstanding—for
example, as in Pakistan in 1999 and the Ukraine and
Ecuador in 2000—are a second voluntary means of
resolving crises.
On occasion, however, the combination of limited IMF
lending and policy adjustment may be inadequate to
mobilize sufﬁcient private ﬁnance on a voluntary
basis—for example, if capital ﬂight is pervasive. In
such situations, it would be counterproductive for the
ofﬁcial sector to continue ﬁnancing private capital
ﬂight. What is needed is some backstop measure to
provide debtors and creditors with a breathing space
to arrive at a co-operative outcome—a standstill.
The role of standstills
Standstills should not be construed as a way of reliev-
ing debtors of their obligation to service their debts in
full and on time. Rather, they are a way of enhancing
the effectiveness of the crisis-management process. In
particular, they offer three beneﬁts.
First, they can promote creditor coordination. An
orderly standstill can break the circuit of destabilizing
and, ultimately, self-fulﬁlling creditor expectations. By
reducing creditor externalities, standstills can be a
positive-sum game, advantageous for debtors and
creditors alike. In a domestic context, Diamond and
Dybvig (1983) show that allowing banks to suspend
withdrawals can be a fully efﬁcient mechanism for
eliminating collective-action problems among creditors.
Second, standstills can align creditor and debtor
incentives. Creditors will be more willing to reach
voluntary agreements quickly if there is a credible
threat of a standstill. And debtors will be more willing
to negotiate if they know that ofﬁcial monies are lim-
ited. So having standstills as a backstop should pre-
vent the prolonged debt negotiations that have
characterized a number of recent IMF program cases.
For example, in the case of Korea in late 1997, a large
ofﬁcial assistance package did little to reduce capital
ﬂight and stabilize the balance of payments. It was
only after “the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
called a meeting to convince key U.S. banks that a roll-
over of their maturing interbank lines was in their
own interest as not all of them could exit at the same
time” that debtors and creditors were able to arrive at
a solution (IMF 2000).
Third, standstills can help ensure that payment stop-
pages are orderly. Standstills provide a safe harbour
while debtors put in place remedial policy actions—
for example, macroeconomic policy adjustment or
debt restructuring. In this way, they are potentially
useful both in cases where a country faces a short-
term liquidity problem that necessitates the reprofiling
of debt service, and in cases of unsustainable debt
burdens where debt reduction is required.
The decision to call a standstill lies with the debtor.
But the ofﬁcial sector can play a useful supporting
role. Such support could take the form of the IMF’s
lending-into-arrears (LIA)—the provision of bridging
ﬁnance. IMF lending would occur only under strict
conditions, however, including the debtor negotiating8 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2001–2002
with its creditors in good faith, creditors being treated
equally, and the process having a deﬁnite time limit.
That would ensure that debtors play fair during a
standstill, neither calling them too often nor maintain-
ing them too long. These guidelines would help
ensure that a standstill is orderly.
Standstill guidelines
Standstill guidelines provide a framework for the res-
olution of sovereign debt problems. They are, in some
respects, akin to bankruptcy procedures. For this rea-
son, some have asked whether sovereign payments
standstills should have a statutory basis. This would
require a change in the law in all jurisdictions in
which a debt contract might need to be enforced. The
advantage of this is that it would confer legal protec-
tion on a debtor calling a standstill.
But changes in the law in many jurisdictions would
also be a formidable exercise. Moreover, it is clear that
countries, having sovereign rights, are different from
corporations in several important respects. Sovereign
debtors do not require a court’s permission to call a
standstill. Moreover, creditors cannot easily seize the
domestic assets of a sovereign. Nor can they insist that
a country’s management be replaced. Because of these
differences, many of the beneﬁts of a standstill can be
achieved within a non-statutory framework, under-
pinned by a set of guidelines (see Schwarcz 2000).
These guidelines would then form the conditionality
that applied to the IMF's lending-into-arrears. An illus-
trative set of guidelines might include:
1. Transparency. The debtor should communi-
cate effectively by releasing all pertinent
information to all creditors on a timely basis.
2. For the debtor to be bargaining in good
faith, offers must be reasonable. Debtors
that are illiquid should be offering resched-
uling that maintains the value of their obli-
gations in net present-value terms. If debt
reduction is necessary, the amount of the
haircut offered by the debtor should not be
greater than necessary to achieve a sustain-
able medium-term debt proﬁle.
3. Creditors should, as far as possible, be
treated equally. This means that not only
should individual creditors (foreign and
domestic) within a class of instruments be
treated the same, but that holders of differ-
ent instruments be treated according to the
seniority of their contracts. A presumption
of seniority should not be made where
none exists in the debt contract.
4.Netnewmoneyshouldbegrantedseniority
over existing claims, consistent with the
“super-priority” principle in a corporate-
insolvency context. Trade credit should be
exempt from the standstill to help maintain
production.
5. The process should be explicitly time-lim-
ited, to prevent debtors maintaining stand-
stills too long. Should the time limit expire
as a result of the debtor failing to submit to
creditors a reasonable offer, then the guide-
lines will have been breached. If, however,
the time limit expires as a result of some or
all creditors failing to accept a reasonable
offer made by the debtor, then the debtor is
not in breach of the guidelines.
 As long as the debtor is taking action that complies
with the guidelines, the IMF should be willing to offer
support by LIA. With this framework in place, there
would be incentives for debtors and creditors to reach
timely agreement on a debt reproﬁling. It would also
be reasonable to hope that, for a debtor country fol-
lowing the guidelines, the risk of litigation from a
creditor would be reduced. That is because creditors
would know that when a debtor has followed the
guidelines, and is therefore treating all creditors in an
even-handed manner, it would be easier to persuade
the courts to side with the debtor and not allow a
minority creditor to grab a country’s assets. Past expe-
rience shows that courts do take the behaviour of
debtors into account. It is true that the recent case
Elliot Associates versus Peru shows that creditors can
prevent a negotiated agreement from coming into
effect. But the recent experience of restructuring debt
in Russia, Pakistan, Ukraine, and Ecuador offers some
encouragement. And either way, there is real merit in
putting in place guidelines that could be used by
courts in their interpretation of the behaviour of debt-
ors and creditors.
Clearly, these guidelines would need to evolve in the
light of experience, to ensure they strike the right bal-
ance between creditor moral hazard on the one hand
(IMF loans ﬁnancing capital ﬂight) and debtor moral
hazard on the other (debtors calling standstills too fre-
quently or maintaining them for too long). But all reg-
ulation needs to be dynamic and responsive to the
changing behaviour of market participants.9 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2001–2002
Potential costs of standstills
A number of potential costs of standstills have been
identiﬁed. While they should not be taken lightly,
many of these costs are more apparent than real.
One argument against standstills is that they under-
mine the primacy of contracts. This argument does
not, however, hold up under close scrutiny. The pre-
sumption should always be that debtors meet their
obligations in full and on time. But faced with a genu-
ine liquidity shortfall or an unsustainable debt bur-
den, meeting contractual terms may be impossible.
In such cases, sovereign debtors need a safe harbour.
Bankruptcy law provides this in a corporate context.
Everyone accepts this as an important part of the
capital market mechanism; it supports, not supplants,
market forces. The same is true in an international
context, where standstill guidelines can serve as surro-
gate bankruptcy law.
A second argument against standstills is that they
may encourage debtors to default. Given emerging-
market economies' dependence on international capi-
tal, it seems unlikely that they would wilfully default
on their obligations. Moreover, the IMF can play a use-
ful role in guarding against strategic default, by refus-
ing to lend-into-arrears to those countries. The
conditionsattachedtolending-into-arrearswouldalso
help ensure the debtor played fair during the stand-
still phase.
A credible, well-managed standstill
ought to enhance value for
longer-term investors by mitigating
the costs of coordination failure.
Some have argued that including standstills in the
framework for crisis resolution might encourage
investors to “rush for the exit” at the ﬁrst sign of trou-
ble, thereby triggering a crisis. Investors with a short
time horizon will always want to get out quickly,
regardless of the institutional arrangements in place.
Against this, the situation for relationship lenders,
who value returns over the medium term, is quite
different. A credible, well-managed standstill ought to
enhance value for longer-term investors by mitigating
the costs of coordination failure. So the incentive
for longer-term investors to rush for the exits will
be reduced. This would mitigate—and potentially
offset—the negative consequences arising from the
behaviour of skittish investors.
Others have argued that standstills may require capi-
tal controls to be enforceable, and that these are
administratively impossible or extremely costly to
impose. In the vast majority of cases, however, capital
controls would not be needed to enforce a standstill; it
would simply be a case of the sovereign ceasing pay-
ments temporarily. Occasionally, this moratorium
may need to extend to the banking system. On rare
occasions, when capital ﬂight is large and persistent,
capital controls may be required to provide a breath-
ing space. But these cases would be the exception, not
the rule. And because these controls would be tempo-
rary, their costs would not be punitive.
Another concern regarding standstills is that they
might lead to contagion. Spillovers are a fact of life in
a world of large, cross-border capital ﬂows. The issue
is whether standstills would worsen these spillovers.
Orderly standstills, as part of a coherent crisis-resolu-
tion framework, ought to mitigate uncertainties about
the work-out process and preserve value. In this way,
they may well relieve contagion risks by comparison
with the counterfactual case of disorderly default.
An apparently powerful argument against standstills
is that they may increase the cost of borrowing and
reduce the ﬂow of capital to emerging markets. This
might happen, for example, because markets raise
their perceived probability of a sovereign default.
Given the high cost of borrowing for emerging mar-
kets, this argument is a potentially potent one. But it is
only part of the story.
First, a lower volume of capital ﬂow does not neces-
sarily translate into lower welfare for a country. Before
the Asian crisis, more capital ﬂowed to emerging mar-
kets than could readily be absorbed. The bust that fol-
lowed the boom was very damaging to the countries
concerned. A lower but more stable ﬂow of capital
would have been welfare-enhancing.
Second, even if aggregate capital ﬂows are lower in a
world of standstills, the composition of capital
ﬂows—less short-term and more long-term lending—
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capital would reduce countries’ susceptibility to
future crises, by reducing the probability of capital-
ﬂow reversals.
Third, there are good reasons for believing an orderly
framework for standstills will not raise the cost of cap-
ital for emerging markets. In pricing country risk,
markets take account of three factors: the probability
of a country defaulting; the recovery value in the
event of a default; and a compensation for risk—a risk
premium. An enhanced role for payments standstills
might arguably increase the perceived probability of
default (though it is possible that the expectation of a
standstill could actually reduce the incidence of
default). But against that, a predictable framework for
crisis resolution will increase the recovery value on
debt in the event of default and lower the degree of
uncertainty regarding work-out procedures. In this
way, the cost of capital for sovereigns may well be
reduced with a clear crisis-resolution framework in
place.
Exceptional Finance
While the framework is founded on the principle of
limited ofﬁcial ﬁnance, exceptional events do some-
times occur. No rule or constraint is inviolable. So
there is a need to preserve the incentives and credibil-
ity of a system of ofﬁcial lending limits, while allow-
ing for a degree of ﬂexibility to deal with truly
exceptional circumstances.
The IMF has long had the ability to lend beyond nor-
mal limits by invoking an exceptional-circumstances
clause or, more recently, through the provision of
loans under the Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF),a
short-term facility introduced in late 1997 in the wake
of the Asian crisis. But procedural safeguards on these
facilities are limited, and the deﬁnition of exceptional
circumstances is left vague. Procedural safeguards
need to be buttressed.
One possible model of procedural safeguards for
exceptional lending is the U.S. Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation (FDIC) Improvement Act of 1991.
The Act allows the FDIC to exempt a bank from “least
cost resolution” provisions if it believes that the ﬁnan-
cial security of the United States is threatened and
FDIC assistance would mitigate adverse effects. This
judgment would be made by the Secretary of the
Treasury, based on the recommendation of two-thirds
of the FDIC Board and the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve, following consultation with the Pres-
ident. The General Accounting Ofﬁce is required to
review the basis for the decision ex post to ensure that
regulators are held responsible for the spirit of the Act
(Bentson and Kaufman 1998).
One possible model of procedural
safeguards for exceptional lending is
the U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation(FDIC)ImprovementAct
of 1991.
Similar rules for good governance can be developed
for IMF lending in the context of international ﬁnan-
cial crises. First, there is a case for identifying more
clearly than at present the circumstances that would
justify a departure from normal lending limits. For
example, one justiﬁcation for exceptional ﬁnance
could be situations that threaten the stability of the
international monetary system. This is consistent with
the rationale the IMF uses when it seeks supplemen-
tary ﬁnancing from the NAB countries.
Second, the mechanism for taking such a decision
needs to be better deﬁned. A special IMF Staff report
could be prepared demonstrating that exceptional cir-
cumstances exist. In addition, the Staff's ﬁndings
would have to be conﬁrmed by a supermajority of the
Executive Board. If a decision was taken to provide
exceptional ﬁnancing, the Staff report should be made
public in the form of an open letter from the Fund's
Managing Director.
Third, it would be necessary to ensure that ofﬁcial
monies were not financing capital flight on an ongoing
basis. A ﬂoor on reserves could be established to serve
as a brake on capital outﬂows. If the reserve ﬂoor was
breached, additional official monies would be sus-
pended.
Finally, those taking the decision to grant exceptional
access would be accountable for their actions ex post
and subject to an independent evaluation. This func-
tion could be performed by the Fund's new Independ-
ent Evaluation Ofﬁce.
A Framework for IMF Intervention
The ﬂow chart (Chart 1) is intended as a summary of
the framework. It is shown as a decision tree, tracing11 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2001–2002
out the chronology of crisis in terms of the options
open to the debtor in moving from crisis to a sustaina-
ble solution.
Consider a stylized example. The ﬁrst order of busi-
ness would be an assessment of the country's debt
burden. If a country's debt burden is not sustainable,
then the provision of ofﬁcial ﬁnance risks worsening a
country's ﬁnancial position:  the solution to the coun-
try’s problem is less debt, not more. Moreover, since
ofﬁcial creditors typically have seniority, this addi-
tional ofﬁcial ﬁnance reduces the value of existing
private claims.
In assessing a country's medium-term debt sustaina-
bility, too much emphasis has in the past been put on
the proﬁle of the country's debt-to-GDP or debt serv-
ice-to-exports ratios, with the debt burden judged to
be sustainable if the ratios are falling over time. This
sort of analysis says nothing about the sustainable
level of these ratios (Cohen 2000). Sustainability anal-
ysis should also assess sustainability thresholds.
If debt is unsustainable, creditors will be required to
reduce their exposures in net present-value terms. In
these circumstances, it is important that there is an
efﬁcient means of organizing creditor-debtor negotia-
tions during the work-out. It is also important that
creditor losses be allocated fairly. Standstill guidelines
provide one means of ensuring that the debt work-out
process is efﬁcient, equitable, and expeditious.
If the debt burden is sustainable, the presumption
would be that normal IMF lending limits applied.
Some countries may be eligible for the IMF’s Contin-
gent Credit Line (CCL), if they have satisﬁed the requi-
site ex ante conditionality. Other countries may be
eligible for a Stand-By Arrangement (SBA), in which
case, they would be required to abide by the requisite
ex post conditionality. In most cases, limited ofﬁcial
assistance of this type would be sufﬁcient to buy time
for the country to overcome a crisis.
In more severe cases, however, ofﬁcial ﬁnance may
not by itself be sufﬁcient. The country may need to
approach creditors in order to raise new money, or
to work out a reproﬁling of its existing debt service.
Because the country's debt burden is sustainable,
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terms under such a rescheduling. So it should be pos-
sible to raise net new ﬁnancing through market-based,
voluntary procedures, such as debt rollovers, swaps,
and exchanges.
But if a voluntary agreement cannot be reached, or if
capital ﬂight is pervasive, the country has recourse to
a standstill in order to halt the liquidity drain. The IMF
can support the standstill by lending-into-arrears if
the country is abiding by its standstill guidelines. The
amount of official resources available under LIA would
be limited to the amount not previously drawn under
the SBA, so that there is an overall limit on access to
IMF resources.
The presumption of normal limits applies to both
SBA- and CCL-eligible countries. Additional ﬁnancing
would be available but only under exceptional cir-
cumstances.Theserequireadditionaljustiﬁcation.The
additional resources would be provided under the
SRF. Funds available under the SRF are of shorter
maturity and higher cost than under the SBA.
Conclusions
There is both a need and a desire for greater clarity in
the framework for crisis resolution. A clear under-
standing of the respective responsibilities of the
private and ofﬁcial sectors is fundamental in this
regard. A central element in shaping private sector
expectations is knowledge that the ofﬁcial sector will
behave predictably. Constraints on IMF lending are a
key step in that direction. They ensure that private
sector involvement is a crucial part of crisis resolution.
And they help encourage debtors and creditors to
seek co-operative solutions to crisis.
A central element in shaping private
sector expectations is knowledge that
the ofﬁcial sector will behave
predictably.
In resolving crises and securing private sector
involvement, the ofﬁcial sector must decide how
much ofﬁcial ﬁnance will be made available and on
what conditions. The debtor country must then decide
which option to follow. One such option is a payments
standstill. The ofﬁcial sector should stand ready to
support standstills if they are implemented in an
orderly fashion. In exceptional circumstances, it may
be necessary to breach normal lending limits. But such
ﬁnancing would be subject to stringent safeguards. A
framework with these characteristics—constraints,
clarity, and orderliness—has the potential to reduce
the incidence and cost of crises.
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